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ABSTRACT 
France and Great Britain jointly declared Europe’s desire for an autonomous 
security and defense capability in St. Malo, France, on December 4, 1998. Using the 
Western European Union as a springboard, the European Union created a second pillar 
wherein lies the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and 
Defense Policy. To what degree has ESDP helped Europe achieve its goal of autonomous 
security and defense operations?  This thesis explores the concept of autonomy with 
respect to the European Union’s civil-military operations policy under ESDP, by 
considering intra-organizational relations (autonomy within organizations) and inter-
organizational relations (autonomy among organizations) employing Principal-Agent and 
Resource Dependency theory. A dialectic concept of autonomy is then applied to ESDP 
and examined through a case study of ESDP civilian and military operations in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. While the EU’s civilian operations exercise a fairly 
high amount of autonomy, its military operations are considerably constrained due to 
member-state prerogatives, a capabilities gap, a subjectivity to United Nations Security 
Council approval and resource dependence on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
“Historically speaking, security and defense are late arrivals on the European 
agenda. But like all young things, the European security and defense policy is growing 
fast.”1 As the first-ever issue of the ESDP newsletter came to press in December 2005, 
Javier Solana2 thus commented on the extremely quick growth of the EU’s joint policy in 
security and defense. The former Spanish Foreign Minister and NATO Secretary-General 
has taken the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) on enormous strides, from a 
fledgling effort to an expanding joint civil-military endeavor. Why did this drive for 
European autonomy in defense matters arise, given the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization’s (NATO) existence since 1949?  
In order to better understand my research question as well as my further train of 
thoughts, I will give the background on ESDP in a nutshell at this point. A review of EU-
forming documents shows that the quest for a European defense can be traced back to the 
Brussels Treaty of 19483, which became the Western European Union (WEU) in 1954, 
and in the increasing European aspiration to expand its predominantly economic focus to 
include an autonomous security and defense aspect. The Brussels Treaty drew in the 
United States (U.S.) to help Western Europe avoid Soviet dominance. For decades 
Western European states could not afford autonomy, but as détente deepened toward the 
end of the Cold War, the idea of “Europeanization”4 flourished and the goal of European 
                                                 
1 Javier Solana, “Forward” to ESDP Newsletter 1, no. 1 (December 2005): 1-36. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/051214_NewsletterFinal.pdf (accessed April 15, 
2006). 
2 Javier Solana holds the dual-position of High Representative (HR) for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and Secretary-General (SG) of the Council of the European Union. 
3 The Treaty of Brussels was signed on March 17, 1948, and amended by the Paris Agreements signed 
on October 23, 1954. The text of the original and modified Brussels Treaty can be found at 
http://www.weu.int/Treaty.htm (accessed September 10, 2006). 
4 Johan P. Olsen provides a good review of its concepts in The Many Faces of Europeanization, ARENA 
Working Paper Series, Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, January 12, 2002, 
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2002/papers/wp02_2.htm (accessed September 10, 
2006). 
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autonomy seemed more attainable. Language in Article 17.2 of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) originally came from the 9-member WEU Petersberg declaration of June 
1992.5 One year later, the heads of state and government from Great Britain and France 
met in St. Malo6 (December 1998) and agreed to create an autonomous EU security and 
defense capability. This was a formative event in European security, because one of 
Europe’s most powerful states (Britain) had formerly been against a separate common 
defense and security policy in Europe.7 This was a crucial dual-track decision; first, the 
WEU would transfer to the EU for peace support operations using NATO assets and 
capabilities; and second, the EU for the first time also aspired alternatively to implement 
peace support operations autonomously. The latter was a revolution in European security 
that gained the most attention in the U.S..  Six months later in Cologne, Germany8, the 
other fifteen EU member states embraced the St. Malo declaration and created ESDP.  
The next major stepping stone was formulating an initial EU military capability 
target. The European Council meeting held in Helsinki, Finland, in December 1999 led to 
the development of the Helsinki Headline Goal.9 Establishment of the goal moved the EU 
toward increased autonomy as it called for “EU member states to be able to deploy 
60,000 troops, within 60 days and sustainable for a year in support of the Petersberg 
Tasks.”10 By November 2000, the 15-member EU envisioned three scenarios for what 
was to be ESDP: 1) evacuation of a few hundred European citizens from sub-Saharan 
                                                 
5 Article 17.2 of the TEU, http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html (accessed August 24, 2006) states, 
“Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and 
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” This article remains, today, the legal 
description until the EU constitutional treaty is ratified. This was later adopted by the fifteen EU member-
states in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. European Council Amsterdam, The Treaty of Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam, Netherlands, October 2, 1997. 
6 British-French Summit St Malo, Joint Declaration, St Malo, France, December 3-41998. 
7 Jolyon Howorth, “Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative,” Survival 42, no.2 (Summer 
2000) 33-55. 
8 European Council Cologne, Declaration of the European Council on Strengthening the Common 
European Policy on Security and Defense, Cologne, Germany, June 3-41999, 
http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/june99_en.htm (accessed August 24, 2006). 
9 Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki, Finland, December 1999, 
http://www.fas.org/ news/europe/991211-mil-eu1.htm (accessed August 24, 2006). 
10 Gustav Lindstrom, On the ground: ESDP Operations, in: Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defense 
Policy. The First Five Years 1999-2004 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 111-130, 
http://www.iss-eu.org/books/5esdpen.pdf (accessed  April 15, 2006), 1. 
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crisis areas; 2) conflict-prevention operations on border disputes in the Balkans; and 3) 
imposing demilitarized zones between warring factions in South Eastern Europe. They 
developed a Requirements Catalogue calling for the availability of over 100,000 military 
personnel, roughly 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels. The September 11 terrorist 
attacks on the United States in 2001 led to a European Council declaration to contribute 
to the fight against terrorism (Seville, June 2002).11 The EU subsequently grew to its 25-
member status and eventually adopted a draft Constitutional Treaty on October 9, 2004 in 
Rome.12 Though not the core of the text, it did included a solidarity clause in case of 
terrorist attacks, “the European Council…decided to step up the action of the Union 
against terrorism through a coordinated and inter-disciplinary approach embracing all 
Union policies, including development of the CFSP and making the ESDP operational. 
The fight against terrorism requires a global approach to strengthen the international 
coalition and to prevent and contain regional conflicts.”13  
Additionally, Solana drafted and received European Council endorsement in 
December 2003 for the first European Security Strategy (ESS).14 The ESS provides a 
strategic framework for EU security and defense policy, tying civilian and military 
operations to the Council’s overall vision of the EU’s role in world affairs. Furthermore, 
it highlighted a European strategic culture that differed from the U.S.. This declaration 
represented an even stronger drive for autonomy. Specifically, the ESS contained three 
important aspects: 1) that the EU should be able to react rapidly to potential threats and 
challenges; 2) that military operations should go hand-in-hand with humanitarian and 
civilian missions; and 3) that many EU missions will be in cooperation with the Atlantic 
                                                 
11 Seville European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Spain, June 2002, 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72638.pdf#search=%22eu%20seville%20declaratio
n%202002%22 (accessed August 24, 2006). 
12 Rome European Council, The European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for 
Europe, Italy, July 2003, http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03. 
pdf#search=%22eu%20draft%20 Constitution%22 (accessed August 24, 2006). The EU became 27 
members on January 1, 2007. 
13 Martin Ortega, Petersberg tasks and missions of the European Force, http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/04-
mo.pdf (accessed Aprril 15, 2006). 
14 European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, Belgium, December 12, 
2003.  
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Alliance.15 ESDP ultimately involved a highly complex web of bodies to carry out its 
decision making.16 However, when it comes to mission execution, the autonomy of 
operations has varied greatly depending on the perspective. The EU desires an 
autonomous security and defense capability, but what constitutes autonomy with respect 
to ESDP operations?  
B. PURPOSE 
This thesis examines the concept of autonomy with respect to the European 
Union’s civil-military operations under ESDP. Challenges currently exist in ESDP’s 
decision-making design, capabilities and missions. These challenges are affecting 
ESDP’s operational autonomy with respect to the assets and capabilities of NATO. But 
what is the EU’s concept of autonomy, and how will closing the capabilities gap within 
the EU and also with the United States (U.S.) affect the EU’s autonomy? The two tracks 
of military and civilian missions differ in their levels of autonomous operation. The thesis 
proposes a concept of autonomy as it pertains to ESDP and presents a case study of 
ESDP missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to highlight the 
challenges ahead.  
The overall question that this thesis seeks to answer is: To what degree has the 
drive for autonomy been a supreme motivational factor for operating and deepening 
ESDP? A subset of questions includes: 
(1) How can we conceptualize the autonomy of international organizations 
such as the EU? 
(2) Do ESDP’s decision-making design, capabilities and missions fulfill the 
EU’s desire to possess an autonomous and common security and defense 
capability?  
                                                 
15 Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World.” European Security Strategy, Brussels, December 
12, 2003. 
16 Antonio Missiroli, ESDP bodies, http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/08-bodies.pdf (accessed 15 Apr 2006), 
and Missiroli, Antonio, ESDP – how it works, in: Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defense Policy. 
The First Five Years 1999-2004 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 55-72, http://www.iss-
eu.org/books/5esdpen.pdf (accessed  April 15,  2006).  
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(3) To what degree does resource dependence affect ESDP autonomy? 
(4) What are the current limits to ESDP autonomy? 
C. IMPORTANCE 
Policy-wise, the findings of this thesis have applicability to ESDP’s future policy 
direction. Comparing ESDP’s current capabilities for autonomous action with the EU’s 
declared intention for autonomous action will illuminate gaps that might be addressed in 
future. This thesis’ findings are also relevant for future policy decisions of other 
international actors like NATO or the U.S., both on what they can expect from ESDP in 
the future and how they can more effectively cooperate with the EU. In particular, a 
greater understanding of ESDP and the EU’s drive for autonomy can aid U.S. policy-
makers in their approach to maintaining and strengthening transatlantic relations.  
Academically, the field of intra- and inter-organizational relations lacks 
systematic research on the subject of autonomy. This thesis adds substance to that void 
by highlighting one of the major driving forces behind ESDP: the European drive for 
autonomy. A better understanding of the degree to which the EU can effectively 
contribute to security and defense in a volatile global arena, and the significance of 
autonomy in doing so, highlights strengths and weaknesses and aids in both the EU’s and 
the international community’s pursuit toward improved cooperation. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
ESDP is still in its infancy, at only 7-years-old, but is maturing very quickly. 
Challenges remain in the institutional design, capabilities and mission accomplishment. 
The newness of ESDP has not provided time for much seasoning, and though it is 
progressing rapidly it is only within a limited scope that is not yet fully complying with 
its founding Petersberg Tasks.17 Europe has repeatedly expressed its desire to have an 
autonomous security and defense capability, but what is the EU concept of “autonomy,” 
                                                 
17 Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, Germany, June 19, 
1992, found at http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf#search=%22petersberg%, (accessed 
August 24, 2006). 
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and how does/will it affect the Atlantic Alliance? Is there a true consensus between all 27 
member states? Or, is there really no common concept of autonomy, but rather the 
collection of individual and differing concepts such as the diverging views of Great 
Britain and France? 
The trans-Atlantic relationship has evolved into a common pluralistic security 
community18 that the Atlantic allies will strive to maintain. The challenge for Javier 
Solana and other Atlantic leaders is to figure out the best way to do this, through 
successful dialectics of institutional purposes, concepts of autonomy, compatibility of 
capabilities and assets as well as strategic cooperation.  
The literature on ESDP deals mostly with foundational and chronological facts, 
mission-specific analysis and the capabilities gap. Very little analysis has been done on 
defining autonomy in International Relations (IR) and specifically how it applies to the 
ESDP context, though Reinalda and Verbeek provide some insight on autonomous policy 
making by international organizations.19 This thesis will pool definitions and concepts 
from other theoretical schools and create a new framework of autonomy for use in IR 
from which recommendations for ESDP enhancement can be explored.  
Though definitions and concepts of autonomy are prevalent in economics, 
sociology and psychology20, there seems to be a void within IR regarding the issue of 
autonomy. Therefore this thesis examines some insights from these disciplines as far as 
they discuss autonomy and propose a new concept of autonomy specifically for inter-
organizational relations. This concept is then applied to ESDP in order to assess its 
understanding and degree of autonomy. Specifically, this thesis builds on two theoretical 
frameworks: organizational theory (including the sub-fields of resource dependence 
theory and inter-organizational relations) and principal-agent theory within IR.  
                                                 
18 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds, Security Communities (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998). 
19 Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek, Autonomous Policy Making by International Organizations, 
(London: Routledge, 1998). 
20 Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., Handbook of Social Psychology (New York: Random 
House, 1985); Neil J. Smelser, and Richard Swedberg, eds., The Handbook of Economic Sociology 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Ron W. Jones and Peter B. Kenen, eds., Handbook of 
International Economics (New York: North Holland, 1985). 
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Organizational theory sources containing concepts of autonomy are primarily 
found in the fields of economics, sociology and psychology.21 These sources provide 
general perspectives that are transferable into an IR context. By constructing a dialectic 
concept of autonomy from these fields, we can come up with a concept of autonomy both 
within and among international institutions.  
Regarding autonomy within institutions, this thesis considers principal-agent 
theory and how it applies to nation-states (principals) and institutions (their agents) 
respectively.22 According to Barnett and Finnemore, principal-agent theory “is concerned 
with whether (actors) are responsible delegates of their principals, whether (agents) 
smuggle in and pursue their own preferences, and how principals can construct various 
mechanisms to keep their (actors) honest.”23 Viewing institutions as corporate actors this 
thesis will explore how independent interests and capabilities lead to autonomous action 
by institutions.  
Autonomy among institutions concerns interorganizational relations which is the 
focus of resource dependence theory.24 This theory begins with the premise that 
institutions always strive for a maximum of autonomy, but they are forced to cooperate 
                                                 
21 Lee Roy Beach and Terry Connolly, The Psychology of Decision Making: People in Organizations, 
2d ed. (London: Sage Publications, 2005); LeRoy A. Bennett, International Organizations: Principles and 
Issues, 6th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995); Alvin Gouldner, “Reciprocity and Autonomy in 
Functional Theory,” in Symposium on Sociological Theory, edited by Llewellyn Gross, 241-70 (New York: 
Row, Peterson and Company, 1959); Gerald Zeitz, “Interorganizational Dialectics,” in Administrative 
Science Quarterly 25, no. 1, 72-88, March 1980. 
22 Clive Archer, International Organizations (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1983); Patricia Dillon, 
Thomas Ilgen and Thomas Willett, “Approaches to the Study of International Organizations: Major 
Paradigms in Economics and Political Science,” in The Political Economy of International Organizations: 
A Public Choice Approach, edited by Ronald Vaubel and Thomas Willett, 79-99 (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1991); Roderick D. Kiewiet, and Mathew McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1991); John Pratt, and Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: the Structure of 
Business (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1985); Roland Vaubel, “A Public Choice View of 
International Organization,” in The Political Economy of International Organizations, edited by Roland 
Vaubel and Thomas Willett, 27-45 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Michael N. Barnett, and Martha 
Finnemore, “The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations,” in International 
Organizations 53, no. 4, 699-732, Autumn 1999; David Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy and the Variety of 
International Relations,” in International Organization 50, no. 1, 1-34, 1996; Mark Pollack, “Delegation, 
Agency and Agenda-Setting in the European Community,” in International Organization 51, no. 1, 99-134, 
1997. 
23 Barnett and Finnemore, 705. 
24 Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective (New York: Harper & Row, 1978). 
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with other organizations to acquire needed resources that they lack, creating an 
unwelcome dependence. The EU’s relationship with the U.S. and NATO is not purely 
resource dependent, but without NATO resources the EU currently cannot carry out its 
full Petersberg Tasks. A major strategic goal for institutions becomes reduction of 
dependency through various tactics. This component of conceptualizing autonomy may 
require creating various levels or dimensions of the concept. A brief review of ESDP 
operations over the last three years shows a growth toward ESDP autonomy apart from 
NATO.25 Most recently the ESDP military operation in Kinshasa, DRC, took place in 
late 2006, which EU officials claim is an autonomous military operation.26  
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis first conceptualizes autonomy for the purposes of this topic, drawing 
on organizational theory and principal-agent-theory. It looks both at intra-organizational 
and inter-organizational autonomy because organizations experience different elements 
of autonomy within their own organization and among other organizations. It then 
transfers this concept to ESDP in order to analyze the conceptual foundation of ESDP. 
Here the approach is mainly process tracing, looking at the evolution of European 
defense autonomy over time, starting from the 1960s up to today, with a focus on the 
formation of ESDP since St. Malo in late 1998. It then moves to a single case study to 
test the findings by looking at a specific ESDP operation claimed to be autonomous. 27 
The thesis concludes by proposing a dialectic concept of autonomy for IR in general and 
for ESDP operations specifically. By analyzing the formation and key developments of 
ESDP, the thesis illustrates the formation of conceptual conflict within the EU 
surrounding ESDP autonomous operations. Specifically, through the lens of autonomy, 
                                                 
25 Giovanni Grevi, Dov Lynch, and Antonio Missiroli, ESDP operations, http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/09-
dvl-am.pdf (accessed April 15, 2006). 
26 Council of the European Union Press Release, General Secretariat, “EU Support to the DRC During 
the Election Process: Background,” Brussels, Belgium, June 2006, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/ cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/90508.pdf (accessed August 
24, 2006). 
27 The wording in quotations is direct from the EU Council’s EUFOR RD Congo webpage located at: 
http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1091&lang=en&mode=g  (accessed on August 24, 
2006). 
 9
this thesis explores ESDP’s raison d’etre, decision-making process (with and without 
NATO), capabilities (military and civilian) and EU-led missions.  
Primary sources for this thesis include EU official documents that led to the 
formation of ESDP and the EUFOR RD Congo operations. Secondary sources provide 
the majority of referenced material. These include texts on theoretical concepts and 
definitions of autonomy, as well as scholarly work on ESDP. Analyses primarily from 
official EU internet sources (prepared by official EU bodies) complement the literature.  
F.  CASE SELECTION 
The ESDP military operation titled EUFOR RD Congo, led by Germany’s Lt Gen 
Karlheinz Viereck, claims to be the first military ESDP operation outside of Europe that 
is completely autonomous from any NATO support. It is the fourth ESDP mission in the 
area following Operation Artemis, and is adding to an ongoing civilian security reform 
mission, and an ongoing civilian police mission in Kinshasa, DRC.28 Under UN Security 
Council Resolution 1671 (26 Apr 06), sixteen EU member states provided roughly 450 
ground troops to Kinshasa and another 1,000-1,500 troops “over the horizon” in Gabon, 
ready to respond if crisis broke out following the first free democratic elections in the 
country in over forty years. They remained in-place for four months until November 
2006, to ensure stability of the UN mission, civilian protection, access to the Kinshasa 
Airport for potential limited extraction operations and force protection.  
This case is appropriate for exploring the autonomous facet of ESDP because it 
claimed to be autonomous and thus reveals the amount of autonomy ESDP is at present 
able to exert. It demonstrates how much the EU is still dependent on resources of others. 
It also touches upon the sovereignty of the EU Heads of State with respect to the EU 
bureaucracy as concerns the division of labor and the member-state control. The main 
questions I ask are: How much autonomy is ESDP really displaying through this 
mission? What are the limits? How is this mission affecting the EU’s relations with the 
                                                 
28 Operation Artemis was a 3-month peace-keeping military operation led by the French in 2003. Other 
missions are titled “EUSEC DR Congo” and “EUPOL Kinshasa.” See the following website for 
information: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cmsUpload/The_mission.pdf (accessed August 24, 
2006). 
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U.S. and NATO? And intra-organizationally, how much power does Solana and his staff 
exhibit in this case over the member states, and how much of his own agenda is he 
seeking? All of these factors are being juggled by the ESDP staff, the Council and the 
member states.  
The DRC situation may provide an indicator of the degree of focus the EU is 
putting on pursuing military capabilities and the limitations of ESDP autonomy to only 
certain types of missions. Rather than centering on a robust military capability, Europe’s 
security concept has recently been more diplomatically focused toward state-building. 
This emphasis on diplomacy includes a toolbox packed more profoundly with EU aid in 
the form of funds, humanitarian assistance and follow-on civilian support. The security 
concept appears to be more reactive in nature in the sense that the missions are usually 
geared towards post-conflict peace building. Solana concluded his opening comment on 
the first ESDP newsletter by stating, “Beyond the structures and the acronyms lie people, 
faces and stories. Above all, there is a European ambition”29, an ambition that will 
optimistically continue to create a more globally secure future. 
 
                                                 
29 Javier Solana, “ESDP Newsletter,” Volume 1, Issue 1, December 2005, 1. 
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II. CONCEPTUALIZING AUTONOMY 
The issue of autonomy spans many disciplines. By considering a few of these 
disciplines, we can find some common themes and ideas that can help develop a concept 
of autonomy within the framework of intra- and inter-organizational relations. Sociology, 
Economics and Psychology discuss autonomy in various handbooks of international 
economics, economic sociology and social psychology. Exploring autonomy within and 
among institutions presents two complementary perspectives on the subject, the former 
through principal-agent theory and the latter via inter-organizational relations and its 
subordinate resource-dependence theory. Through these theoretical studies, a concept of 
autonomy can be developed for intra- and inter-organizational relations, which is then 
applied to ESDP in the chapters that follow. 
A. AUTONOMY IN THEORY: CONCEPTS OF AUTONOMY WITHIN 
ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY 
Autonomy in the field of international economics is primarily rooted in a state’s 
trade policy on the macroeconomic level. Nations have sovereignty to make trade policy 
decisions of their own choosing; however, they also must deal with the consequences. 
Many times the consequences are so politically charged that they impinge on a state’s 
autonomy to truly choose what they desire. Protectionist measures create ripples in the 
pursuit of free markets and affect (positively and/or negatively) the states economy. 
States with stronger economies have more freedom to exercise their autonomy in trade 
policy, whereas developing countries with weak economies are bound to follow the 
demands of the international economy if they want a chance to thrive.30  
The classic theorists of economic sociology, such as Karl Marx (1818-1883), Max 
Weber (1864-1920), Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) and Georg Simmel (1858-1918), 
focused on the social role of the economy in society; they are predominantly concerned 
with the effects of capitalism.31 On the microeconomic level, the ideas of the autonomous 
                                                 
30 Jones and Kenen, vol. 1. 
31 Smelser and Swedbergs, 7-11. 
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individual striving to make his or her way in the economic world clash with “the invisible 
hand” of class struggle. The division of labor and class structure purports a certain lack of 
individual autonomy on a larger scale, yet individual interests, values and social trust that 
make up the relative worth of money enables the countless transactions within economies 
on a smaller scale. This dichotomy suggests that the concept of autonomy in the field of 
economic sociology is dependent on the level of analysis, whereby the smaller, more 
individual levels retain more autonomy as opposed to the larger, more collective levels 
that restrict autonomy more.  
Sociologists speak of functional autonomy and its relationship with inter-
dependence and system tension.32  The main assumption is that there are varying degrees 
of inter-dependence among the parts within any given system. A key concept relevant to 
the organizations and the international system is that “the parts may have varying 
amounts of their needs satisfied by, and thus varying degrees of dependence upon, other 
system elements.” Some systems exist whereby the parts are highly dependent upon all 
other parts in the system to fulfill their needs (low functional autonomy) and other 
systems contain parts that derive minimal satisfaction of needs via the other parts (high 
functional autonomy). An example of a low functional autonomy system would be an 
aircraft manufacturing operation, whereby various parts of an aircraft are manufactured in 
multiple factories all around the world. The overall company is highly dependent on each 
factory to complete the building of the aircraft, and factories’ needs are fulfilled by 
materials, equipment and well-made parts of other factories. Conversely, an example of a 
high functional autonomy system might be the International Olympic Committee, 
whereby each individual country does not require needs to be filled by the other countries 
in this system. In other words, “operationally speaking, the functional autonomy of a 
system part is the probability that it can survive separation from the system.”33 Tensions 
occur when parts with high functional autonomy maintain their identity and fulfill their 
needs outside the system if the system seeks to control the part. These ideas coincide with 
resource-dependency theory discussed later in the chapter.  
                                                 
32 Gross, 254-259. 
33 Ibid., 254 (for both quotes in this paragraph). 
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The field of psychology contains much research on the subject of autonomy. The 
phenomenon of group dynamics within the social psychology field is most applicable to 
this study. In particular, the type of group that most accurately describes the EU and the 
international system in general is the type that is “pluralistic, comprising independent 
[sub-]groups with overlapping memberships.”34 People in these types of group situations, 
who are involved in multiple voluntary groups tend to emphasize more profoundly the 
role expectations within the group that they are most interested in. These role 
expectations are either inscribed in the groups forming documents or are merely based on 
individual perceptions. Therefore, when individuals choose to abide by these role 
expectations, they are giving up more autonomy within this group setting than they are 
when they are operating in groups that hold less interest to them. What begins with an 
autonomous decision to abide by role expectations actually decreases their autonomy of 
actions within that group.35  
Most of the concepts discussed above are relevant to autonomy existing within 
institutions. To more fully explore autonomy within institutions, principal-agent theory is 
applied to the EU framework, whereby the principals are the sovereign member states, 
and the agent is the EU bureaucracy that formulates and implements ESDP.  
B. AUTONOMY WITHIN INSTITUTIONS: PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
An international organization becomes a corporate actor (or agent) in 
international politics particularly once it has “[built] up a bureaucracy, a modus operandi 
and a role not totally dependent on the acceptance of its every act by all its 
membership.”36 But how effectively do international bureaucracies exert the autonomy 
that they borrow from their sovereign member states, or principals?37 Principal-agent 
theory helps explore the intricacies and dialectics of autonomy found in the relationship 
                                                 
34 Lindzey and Aronson, vol 4, 304. 
35 Ibid., 303-307. 
36 Archer, 144. 
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between member states and bureaucracies of international organizations. “Preliminary 
research on NATO and OSCE seems to confirm the early thesis by Cox and Jacobson 
that in salient, ‘high politics’ issues the autonomy of international organizations is 
comparably limited, whereas it is more pronounced in ‘technical’ issues within the 
confines of imperfect member-state control.” 38  
Organizations are initially created without autonomy; merely fulfilling tasks of 
the initiating member states. Over time, however, member states principals begin to 
delegate various amounts of autonomy to the agent organization. Bureaucratic drifting or 
shirking ensues as the agent organization strives for greater autonomy. Here, principals 
and agents begin to struggle over control. Member-states apply control mechanisms to 
maintain control of the organization’s bureaucracy. One mechanism includes rotating the 
key leadership positions. If, for instance, an organization containing a leader appointed 
by a member-state strays from the member-state’s interests that leader can, at least in 
principle, be replaced with someone else. There is a time-lag in that situation, whereby 
the bureaucracy may continue down an autonomous path in its decision making for a 
period until it can be reigned back in. 
Many member states add another element of control when forming international 
organizations; the requirement of ratification of treaties and constitutions, and decision-
making bodies and rules such as consensus (which gives each member veto authority) or 
qualified majority voting. Many of the decisions made by an international organization 
are required to gain ratification of member states before taking effect. Depending on the 
bureaucratic rules in-place, this element of ratification provides a powerful tool to the 
principals in controlling the actions of the agent. For example, the EU’s draft constitution 
that would have provided much more bureaucratic control and autonomy to its 
                                                                                                                                                 
37 This question was analyzed in a yet-to-be published text by Rafael Biermann, referencing work by 
Kurt P. Tudyka, “The margin beyond intergovernmentalism. The Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe.” in Autonomous Policy Making by International Organizations, edited by Bob 
Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek (London: Routledge, 1998), 109. 
38 Biermann, p. 8 of yet-to-be published text, referencing Hadewych Hazelzet, “The decision-making 
approach to international organizations. Cox and Jacobson’s anatomic lesson revisited.” in Autonomous 
Policy Making by International Organizations, edited by Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek (London: 
Routledge, 1998), 28 and 35. 
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organization was halted by a few member states when they failed to ratify the document. 
In this manner, the principals maintained control of the amount of autonomy allowed to 
the agent.  
There is a third tool of control that principals use: they provide resources to the 
agent, without which he cannot act. Member-states maintain ownership of resources that 
are required by international bureaucracies. For instance, in the security arena assets such 
as personnel, funding or transportation for civilian and military operations that are 
required to fulfill an organization’s decision to act are all owned by the member states. 
By maintaining a process that relies on volunteerism in procuring operational assets and 
capabilities to operations, principals can retain their sovereignty to decide whether or not 
they will participate and to what degree in any operation. Ultimately, the organization is 
completely at the mercy of the member states when it comes to operationalizing their 
decisions.  
Therefore, autonomy within institutions rests first of all with the member-state, 
then to a much more limited degree with the international bureaucracy, especially its top 
officials. Once these top bureaucratic officials are given autonomy, however, a sort of 
chain reaction occurs that sets in motion a process that is very difficult for the principals 
to control. For example, when the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, was 
delegated the task of pursing operations in the DRC (see Chapter V), he is given authority 
for many follow-up decision in pursing that operation. The wider the mandate an agent 
organization is given from the principals, the more ambiguity leads to greater autonomy 
for the agent. The principals try to use control mechanisms such as directing the 
employment of leadership position, requiring a ratification process for high-level 
decisions and maintaining ownership of the resources required to limit this growing 
autonomy that the agent tries to advance. But what are the dialectics of autonomy 
between organizations?  When confronted with an international situation, how does 
autonomy work among institutions?  
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C. AUTONOMY AMONG INSTITUTIONS: INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL 
RELATIONS AND RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 
Autonomy among institutions involves factors of interdependence usually based 
upon resources and the degree of competitiveness. “In social systems and social 
interactions, interdependence exists whenever one actor does not entirely control all of 
the conditions necessary for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the outcome 
desired from the action.”39 Nearly all of the major organizations in the international 
system have some degree of interdependence among each other. Specifically in the 
security arena, organizations such as the EU, NATO, UN and OSCE are dependent upon 
each other because of over-lapping memberships, scarce resources and competing or 
symbiotic goals. “Interdependence is important to an organization because of the impact 
it has on the ability of the organization to achieve its desired outcomes.”40 But what is the 
main factor that influences interdependence? 
Within resource-dependence theory, the social control of organizational choice is 
directly related to where the control of resources resides.41 Organizations make decisions 
based on their demand for particular resources controlled by another organization. In 
other words, “organizations will tend to be influenced by those who control the resources 
they require.”42 Resources possess varying importance, allocation discretion and 
concentration of control. These factors figure into the level of dependence an 
organization has upon another, hence affecting the amount of autonomy afforded to the 
resource-deficient organization. Resource-dependence theory views organizations as 
“other-directed [and] involved in a constant struggle for autonomy and discretion, 
confronted with constraint and external control.”43 Conversely, organizations that are 
designed to avoid interdependence, such as the International Court of Justice, the 
                                                 
39 Pfeffer and Salancik, 40. 
40 Ibid., 41. 
41 Ibid., 257-262. 
42 Ibid., 44. 
43 Ibid., 257. 
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European Central Bank or National Parliaments, have less resource dependence on other 
organizations, thereby possessing the most autonomy.  
Today’s organizations contending in the international security arena are split by a 
vast capabilities gap. Organizational decision making and autonomy is very much driven 
by the availability of resources. For example, an international organization is limited in 
the security-related operations they can realistically pursue directly based on the 
capabilities they possess, and/or the capabilities they can borrow. Here is where resource 
pooling and resource provisioning come in as a means to increase the overall resources 
available to an organization. This borrowing creates a limiting factor to organizational 
autonomy, because the borrowing organization is dependent upon the resource owner’s 
goodwill who is trying to maintain full control himself over his resources. 
The field of inter-organizational relations also wrestles with the element of 
competition. Organizations strive for relevance in order to maintain survival. Particularly 
in the international security arena, adaptation to an ever-changing environment is crucial 
to organizational survival. Overlapping membership among organizations creates an 
informal (or even formal) hierarchy of member-state preferences. Each member-state 
decides, based on values and preferences, how much relative importance, and therefore 
how much effort and how many resources it is willing to invest into each organization. 
International bureaucracies create agendas that help them compete against other 
organizations for member-state interest and scarce resources, thereby increasing or 
decreasing autonomy relative to the amount of member-state interest and resources they 
can obtain compared to other organizations.  
D. CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY: INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL AND INTER-
ORGANIZATIONAL 
By combining elements of autonomy found in the fields of economics, sociology 
and psychology with elements found in Principal-Agent Theory and Resource 
Dependence Theory, a concept of autonomy emerges for intra- and inter-organizational 
relations. International bureaucracies are concerned with agendas and politically-charged 
consequences of attempting to exercise autonomy. Levels of organizational autonomy are 
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directly related to the scale and scope of decision and operations. Varying degrees of 
interdependence within and among organizations weigh heavily on the fulfillment of 
organizational and independent needs. Perceptions and the phenomenon of role 
expectations add variables to the individual performance level within organizational 
bureaucracies. All of these dynamic factors fuel a dialectic of organizational autonomy 
defined primarily on fluid degrees of dependence both on member states and on other 
organizations.  
The amount of autonomy an organization can exert is largely determined by its 
member states via control mechanisms that include rotating leadership, domination of 
governing bodies, member-state decision making and member-state control over 
resources. The autonomy of an international organization is also subject to dependence 
on other organizations via its demand and accessibility of resources driven by the 
competition for survival and relevance in the international system. Therefore, 
international organizations are never truly autonomous in the purest sense. Rather, they 
must persistently plead and maneuver, compete and persuade, expand and acquire 
resources to maintain or enhance in what turns out to be a complicated dialectic of 
autonomy and dependence. How can we apply this concept of autonomy to the EU, and 
specifically to ESDP? 
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III. APPLYING AUTONOMY TO ESDP 
Intra- and inter-organizational relations aspects are crucial to applying the concept 
of autonomy to ESDP. This chapter first focuses on the absolute and relative aspects of 
autonomy from an EU member-state perspective. As the previous chapter concluded, 
international organizations do not realize a pure form of autonomy, rather a dialectic that 
is dependent upon its principal member states and the resource needs met by other 
organizations. How do the EU member states achieve autonomy in their own security and 
defense decisions relative to the autonomy Solana achieves through CFSP and ESDP?  
The second section of this chapter explores elements of sovereignty and 
accountability. The growing international emphasis on ensuring human rights throughout 
the globe threatens the tenants of sovereignty via the enforcement of accountability. What 
does this say about national sovereignty within the context of the EU and ESDP?  
A. EU MEMBER-STATE PERSPECTIVES OF AUTONOMY: ABSOLUTE 
VS. RELATIVE 
Both absolute and relative measures of autonomy are difficult to capture. Intra- 
and inter-organizational relations blur the lines of concrete evidence, yet, it is clear that 
pure autonomy of decision making and policy implementation does not exist within and 
among international organizations. Within the EU, factors of national interest and shifting 
variables of political, social, economic and military ends and means are multiplied by 27 
member states. Competition among organizations in an anarchic international system 
continually shifts burdens, responsibilities and organizational goals. The autonomy of 
ESDP, therefore, is a dialectic combination of the relative intra-organizational autonomy 
of the EU member states vis-à-vis the ESDP common structures in Brussels and ESDP’s 
relative inter-institutional autonomy vis-à-vis other security and defense organizations in 
the international system. How is autonomy in the security and defense arena balanced 
between the EU member states and the common ESDP structures in Brussels, and how 
much autonomy in the security and defense arena does the EU have vis-à-vis other 
international players?  
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The relative security and defense autonomy of EU member states vis-à-vis 
Brussels can be analyzed by looking both at the member states’ and the EU’s ability to 
achieve their security and defense ends through their means of decision-making, 
capabilities and types of missions.44 As concerns the security and defense capability of 
each individual member-state, it varies greatly. The larger states with larger budgets and 
assets could theoretically achieve their security and defense goals independently of the 
EU However, since World War II, Europe has pushed for an integrated European identity 
to eliminate future intra-European wars, which implies a system of pooled sovereignty in 
a post-Westphalian system. The smaller states with smaller budgets and fewer assets 
would have a much greater challenge in achieving their security and defense goals alone. 
Through ESDP, all the member states not only pool and thus increase their assets and 
capabilities but also their political leverage in world affairs, thus enhancing their ability 
to achieve security and defense goals.45 The smaller states benefit much more than the 
larger states in this respect, because they can leverage the power of the larger states that 
they themselves lack, merely through bandwagoning. The gain of assets and capabilities, 
however, does come with a cost. This cost is a decrease in member-state autonomy due to 
decision making being transferred from the national capitals to Brussels.  
The decision-making process of ESDP, on the other hand, does heavily rely on 
member-state sovereignty through voting rules, voluntary participation and voluntary 
retraction at any time. In other words, member states retain sovereignty by maintaining a 
purely voluntary structure in ESDP, and uphold the right to pull back troops, assets, or 
another aspect of voluntary participation that they have pursued if they so decide. ESDP 
is markedly different in this respect from the first, supranationally organized pillar of the 
EU (including e.g. the Common Market), but even from CFSP in some respects. There is 
e.g., no qualified majority voting. Through the ESDP format, a single “no” vote by any 
member-state kills a proposal. Therefore, the autonomy of a member-state to block 
security and defense decisions and operations through ESDP channels is greater than the 
                                                 
44 These characteristics are explored more thoroughly in Chapter IV, Section C.  
45 European Union Council Secretariat, Development of European Military Capabilities: The Force 
Catalogue 2006, Brussels, November 2006, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ 
cmsUpload/MilitaryCapabilitiesFC06backgroundNov06_en.pdf (accessed April 25, 2007). 
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autonomy to see an action through to completion, by the fact that any other member-state 
has veto authority in the ESDP process. For instance, if a member-state sought to use 
ESDP for a particular security and defense mission, the process by which it could 
actually come to fruition is much more challenging than the process to eliminate the 
initiative altogether. In the case of CFSP and ESDP, however, Solana plays a key role in 
driving the bureaucratic elements of agenda-setting, initiating policies and coalition-
building. In this instance, the agent is constantly pushing for more autonomy over the 
member states. 
On the other hand, ESDP autonomy is restricted vis-à-vis other international 
actors. Realizing security and defense initiatives outside of EU borders relies on 
cooperation with other international organizations, particularly NATO and the UN, but 
also state actors. EU has assumed the self-imposed obligation to act only based on a UN 
mandate. In case of peace keeping or peace building, it also waits for the consent of host 
countries, which limits its autonomy not only before, but also during both military and 
civilian operations. ESDP is mainly about international crisis management. This has 
become a multilevel bargaining process, with international organizations like the EU as 
one actor in a highly complex vertical decision-making process.  
The ESDP mission track record undeniably shows a UN Security Council 
Resolution prerequisite to nearly all military operations in and outside EU borders, as 
opposed to no UN Security Council Resolution prerequisite for civilian operations.46 Of 
the twelve ESDP civilian operations since 2003, primarily police and rule-of-law 
assistance missions, the EU acted based on its own authority. Whereas, of the four ESDP 
military operations since 2003, only once did the EU act without first obtaining a UN 
Security Council Resolution. Operation Concordia, however, used NATO assets in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to help extend a secure environment 
at the explicit request of the FYROM government. Furthermore, in two of the other three 
military operations, ESDP used NATO assets and capabilities to perform the mission. 
                                                 
46 European Council, European Security and Defense: Operations, http://www.consilium. 
europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g (accessed April 25, 2007). 
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Therefore, in the inter-organizational relations arena, it is clear that ESDP possesses more 
autonomy in its civilian operations than it does in its military operations.   
The relative autonomy of member states within the ESDP context varies 
depending not only on security and defense capabilities, but also prestige, leverage and 
authority. Autonomy of member states to act in a security and defense arena is lessened 
by the principal-agent relationship that encompasses ESDP, yet the autonomy to prevent 
other member states from acting is increased through the same structure. The relative 
autonomy of ESDP to act in the international system is greater in civilian operations and 
lesser in military operations due to resource dependence (on NATO) and achieving 
alleged legitimacy (through the UN). How do these limits of autonomy affect the 
sovereignty of the nation-state?  
B. SOVEREIGNTY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
The characteristics of sovereignty that began to form in the Peace of Westphalia 
in 1648 and were then strengthened through the political writings of Machiavelli, Luther, 
Bodin and Hobbes are being challenged today, inter alia by increased interdependence 
and multilateralism as evidenced in international organizations. Since World War II, in 
particular, there has been a steady rise of international organizations.47 A modern 
definition by Ernst Kantorowicz of a sovereign entity describes “a single, unified one, 
confined within territorial borders, possessing a single set of interests, ruled by an 
authority that was bundled into a single entity and held supremacy in advancing the 
interests of the polity.”48 More simply stated, sovereignty involves an entity that holds 
supreme authority within a given territory. Within the past half century, however, 
organizations such as the UN, NATO and the EU have challenged state sovereignty 
through pooling economic, political, and more recently, military means.  
                                                 
47 For background information and figures supporting this claim, see the introduction of Volker 
Rittberger and Bernhard Zangl, International Organizations: Polity, Politics and Policies (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), and Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, Handbook of 
International Relations (London: Sage Publications, 2002). 
48 Dan Philpott, "Sovereignty,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2003 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/sovereignty/ (accessed April 17, 
2007).  
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Absolute sovereignty, which Bodin and Hobbes envisioned extended to every 
facet within a given territory,49 was of course never realized. European integration further 
compromised it, starting in 1951 via the Treaty of Paris which formed the European Coal 
and Steel Community.50 Since then, EU member states exercised pooled sovereignty 
which implies non-absolute authority within their territorial boundaries due to the 
encroachment of EU decision making. Although member states maintain supreme 
authority in governing their own defense, many do not govern their own currency, trade 
policies and social welfare policies. Rather, these issues are governed by EU law. 
Authority expansions achieved within the European Common Market and Monetary 
Union, and by the European Court of Justice and the European parliament, challenge the 
sovereignty of EU member states from within their own international organization, e.g. as 
the European Central Bank decides on inflating or deflating the Euro. Similarly, UN 
sanctions and the international criminal court provide further encroachments on state 
sovereignty among organizations.51 
The increasing international emphasis on policing the globe to ensure basic 
human rights has tacked the feature of accountability onto state sovereignty. The view of 
the sovereign authority as a “transcendent entity, holding the supreme and inalienable 
right to rule over the people, independently of them, rather than representing the people, 
accountable to them,”52 has given way over the past two and half centuries to a 
democratic version based in natural law that demands sovereign states represent their 
people and be accountable to them. Recently, after the end of the Cold War, this new 
balancing of human rights versus sovereignty has significantly gained strength, as can be 
seen from the new instrument of humanitarian interventions, undertaken to stop gross 
violations of human rights, even if this means intervention in “internal affairs” and thus 
infringing sovereignty rights. With human rights as the trigger point, international 
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organizations such as the UN, NATO, OSCE and the EU are more than ever intervening 
through political diplomacy, economic sanctions and even military force. Every 
“sovereign” state, therefore, has lost some sovereignty through the very nature of an 
evolving international system that is demanding and enforcing state accountability, both 
vis-à-vis its own people and vis-à-vis the international community.  
What does this transformation of sovereignty and increase in accountability say 
about autonomy, particularly of EU member-state and EU bureaucracy? Although the EU 
is more and more encroaching on the sovereignty of its member states, one critical 
element of the union, particularly evident within EDSP, actually maintains most (but not 
all) of member-state sovereignty and autonomy. That critical element is voluntary 
participation. “In effect, [the EU] has become a federal non-state whose decisions are 
accepted voluntarily by its constituent units rather than backed up by the modes of 
hierarchical coercion classically employed by the modern state.” It has, in effect, 
preserved state sovereignty by constructing “the separation of law from the power to 
enforce it”53 such that EU laws and member-state enforcement reside only in the first 
pillar. ESDP is more supranational, however, and requires unanimity in its decision-
making, rather than allowing qualified majority voting similar to other EU decision-
making processes.   
European states have held tight to their sovereignty and do their best to maintain 
it, even while integrating into multilateral institutions like the EU. While member states 
integrate into the EU, they also strive for maximum control within its bodies. Autonomy 
is a dear aspect of guarding sovereignty. A look at Europe’s drive for autonomy over the 
past half century highlights the path of ESDP formation.  
 
                                                 
53 Marc F. Plattner, “Self-government Needs the Nation-State,” Sovereignty and Democracy, Hoover 
Institute, Stanford University, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3446091.html (accessed 
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IV. IMPORTANCE OF AUTONOMY IN ESDP FORMATION 
European states have suffered through many wars and countless battles, but 
World War II changed the continent in a way that desperately inspired a “never again” 
sentiment, particularly in the West. This chapter first explores the steps of an increasingly 
united Europe in the second half of the twentieth century and its relationship with NATO. 
It then deconstructs some of the member-state motivations for creating an autonomous 
European security and defense capability, as well as U.S./NATO reactions. Third, it takes 
a look at the decision-making structure, capabilities and types of missions to tease out the 
current status of ESDP’s autonomy and dependence. All of these insights contribute to 
understanding the importance of autonomy as Europeans conceptualized, formed and 
continue to expand ESDP.  
A. BACKGROUND: BUILDUP OF EUROPEAN QUEST FOR AUTONOMY 
(PRECURSORS TO ST. MALO) 
The December 1998 Anglo-French declaration in St. Malo, France, for an 
autonomous European security and defense capacity was somewhat of a surprise to the 
U.S. and even to the French themselves as the UK had previously been totally 
unsupportive of the idea.54 What were the events that led to this declaration? This section 
begins in the 1960s with Charles de Gaulle’s staunchly nationalistic French 5th Republic 
and traces the ebb and flow of support for European autonomy in various venues leading 
up to the St. Malo declaration. 
1. 1960s – de Gaullism 
The 1960s were a trying time for the European integrationists, as President 
Charles de Gaulle insisted on focusing efforts toward a stronger, autonomous French 
nation-state. Having been battered by two world wars and suffering through a handful of 
harsh colonial conflicts in Indochina and North Africa during the Fourth Republic, the 
French public was relieved to see their wartime hero, de Gaulle, once again in power and 
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demanding a strong presidency, fully in charge of foreign policy and defense. With 
Germany reindustrialized and rearmed, de Gaulle strengthened relations with German 
chancellor Konrad Adenauer to gain Germany’s support of strengthening the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) in France’s favor. De Gaulle further obtained the aid of his 
neighbor to successfully block Great Britain from the European Community membership, 
a membership that would likely have decreased France’s aspiration to lead “an 
economically strong, politically assertive, and militarily independent Europe.”55 
The other Western European states, however, feared French or Franco-German 
hegemony in the Fouchet Plans and backed away, leaving France and Germany to create 
their own bilateral treaty. The Franco-German Treaty of Friendship and Reconciliation 
signed in the Elysée Palace in January 1963 included commitments by both countries “to 
consult each other, prior to any decision, on all questions of foreign policy…with a view 
to reaching an analogous position.”56 The Treaty was highly controversial in Germany, 
provoking a debate among “Atlanticists” and “Gaullists,” with the former winning the 
day when parliament amended the treaty with a preamble reaffirming Germany’s 
transatlantic orientation. Unfortunately, due to de Gaulle’s disregard for anything other 
than French national benefit, the European Community stumbled into serious trouble. De 
Gaulle demanded CAP in favor of French agriculture at the expense of the Community, 
yet without France, the Community feared advancement. It even took a compromise in 
Luxembourg in May 1966 that included temporary funding of the costly CAP to bring de 
Gaulle back into the EC-fold; another victory for France and de Gaulle’s quest for 
autonomous decision making within the EC.  
As de Gaulle and the EC began to focus more on foreign policy, France’s 
domestic situation led to the demise of de Gaulle’s reign in 1968. Riots and the resulting 
Lame Duck situation de Gaulle found himself in eventually drove him from power. What 
began as a quest for national autonomy within the European Community structure caused 
severe struggle to a fledgling international organization and ultimately led to the downfall 
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of a powerful national leader. The gains of the EC were significant but painful. Yet 
Western Europe was about to embark on greater success as it began to defer to a 
strengthened Germany and a look toward the East with Ostpolitik and a new common 
foreign policy procedure known as the European Political Cooperation.57  
2. 1970s – European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
Two reports played key roles in establishing the EPC. The Luxembourg Report of 
1970 and the Copenhagen Report of 1973 identified four levels to promote greater 
political cooperation. These levels involved regular meetings of the heads of state and 
government (which later became the European Council) to provide overall direction; the 
foreign ministers on a monthly basis to prepare and follow up on summit meetings and 
foreign policy issues; the political committee (foreign ministries’ political directors) to 
prepare and follow up on foreign minister meetings; and, working groups (midlevel 
foreign ministry officials) to prepare reports, liaise between foreign ministries and 
prepare political committee meetings.58 
Under the EPC process, the member states were most successful in issues 
involving economic cooperation and human rights. Members-states maintained autonomy 
in that there was no voting, but rather negotiations and informal pressures to gain 
consensus. Yet, overall due to these informal pressures, autonomy was somewhat 
persuaded as there developed “a strong tendency to follow the opinion of the majority.”59 
The EPC process was just a beginning for cooperation, but far too slow in reacting to 
crises, until the Cold War began to heat up with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979 and its imposition of martial law in Poland two years later. These East-
West stressors led the agenda to discussion of common security. Many member states, 
such as Britain and the Netherlands, were concerned that the development of an EC-
based common security structure would upset the U.S., while others, such as Ireland, 
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Denmark and Greece, were constrained by domestic politics.60 It was clear that Europe 
was not yet ready to budge on national autonomy with respect to security and to seek 
organizational autonomy from NATO and the U.S.. The leap toward common European 
security required the revival of a moth-balled organization, and further progress toward a 
common European identity.  
3.  1980s – “Europeanization” and the Western European Union 
As the EPC process advanced and as the limitations of it became increasingly 
apparent especially in crisis reaction, the desire of EC member states to strengthen its 
foreign policy identity increased. Since Afghanistan in 1979, Europeanization was a 
response to both endogenous and exogenous factors. The endogenous factors included the 
deficiency of EPC, while the exogenous factors involved the growing strain on 
transatlantic relations and a new phase of unprecedented détente that gave Western 
Europe more leeway to act autonomously.61 By the mid-1980s, all member states were in 
agreement to more closely align the EC’s external economic policy with member states’ 
foreign policies. This wave of “Europeanization” included “formalizing EPC in the Rome 
Treaty, strengthening cooperation procedures, providing a special secretariat for the 
process, and incorporating military and defense issues.”62 The Single European Act of 
1987 established a special secretariat in Brussels, created a mechanism for convening 
discussions and stipulating EC external policies align with EPC agreements. As 
Europeanization strengthened the European identity, and the Cold War ended, the seeds 
of developing an autonomous European security and defense capability were sown.  
Development of the Maastricht Treaty showed a deepening aspiration for 
European autonomy as the EPC was transformed into the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), grounded in a second pillar apart from the EU (formerly the EC). Just a 
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few years early, at the height of U.S.-Soviet tension, members of the moribund Western 
European Union (WEU) had begun to explore an increased security and defense identity; 
one that did not include the U.S.. France, in particular, was highly interested in 
revitalizing the WEU. Returning to the forefront as CFSP was established, the WEU 
answered the structural call to create a defense identity as EU member states struggled to 
address the crisis in Yugoslavia. Torn between “Europeanist” countries, such as France 
which was now sided by Germany, and “Atlanticist” countries, such as Britain, the 
Maastricht Treaty highlighted a compromise, allowing for “the eventual framing of a 
common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.”63 With a 
revived WEU potentially, the push for an autonomous European security and defense 
capability and a potentially dieing NATO utility following the Cold War, a concerned 
NATO spoke up in Berlin to ensure its organizational survival and a continued 
transatlantic focus. The debate grew on whether the WEU would lean toward NATO or 
the EU. 
4. 1990’s – CFSP, Berlin Plus and EU/NATO Relations 
The last decade of the 20th century was paramount to transforming EU/NATO 
relations. While the end of the Cold War left NATO grasping for a new mission focus, 
the EU attempted to spread its security and defense wings. Unfortunately for the EU (and 
perhaps fortunately for NATO), the initial efforts under CFSP led to dismal failure in 
Yugoslavia, and a ‘failure to launch’ situation in Kosovo. Both of these NATO successes 
came as a slap in the face to Europeanists, but also served as motivators to focus more 
deeply on achieving success in autonomy.  
The establishment of the Contact Group in April 1994, and the subsequent Dayton 
Accords signed in Paris in November 1995 served as stimuli to foreign and security 
policy reform. Using the Petersberg Declaration64 of 1992 as a springboard, the 
Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 overhauled CFSP to better facilitate European security and 
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defense policy coordination, cooperation and action. Among other enhancements, it 
created the position of the High Representative to CFSP, which was implemented in May 
1999.  The drive to strengthen CFSP concerned NATO leadership (particularly U.S. 
officials), and together with the Bosnian war, led to endorsement of a specific European 
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. “The U.S. recognized that 
there could be crises in Europe in which Washington would not want to intervene.” Thus, 
“a compromise was reached whereby WEU could act independently but making use of 
NATO assets and capabilities.”65 The Berlin agreement of 1996 and the subsequent three 
years of negotiations leading to the package deal of WEU and NATO signed at NATO’s 
Anniversary Summit in April 1999 in Washington created an interesting twist to 
European autonomy. It increased EU autonomy by recognizing and endorsing the need 
for European action outside of NATO-U.S. involvement, yet it limited European 
autonomy by binding WEU action (the WEU had no own assets) to using NATO assets 
and capabilities.  
The WEU/NATO bargain was outdated the moment it was signed, due to the 
European wake-up call that was Kosovo. St. Malo occurred before the air campaign–it 
was the frustrating prospect of another war in the Balkans that loomed large when the 
fighting in Kosovo escalated among the Serbian forces and the Kosovo-Albanian KLA 
since February 1998. It was another trigger motivating the drive for an autonomous 
European defense. And it was further spurred by the stressful European experience with 
the NATO Air Campaign from March to June 1999. Highlighting for the first time the 
depth of the transatlantic “capabilities gap,” especially its political repercussions on both 
sides of the Atlantic (decreased relevance of the Europeans, increased impetus to “got it 
alone” on the U.S. side) it served as a major catalyst for strengthening European defense. 
Building on the St. Malo declaration of December 1998, the EU created its European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in June 1999, incorporating soon the WEU into this 
new framework. Accordingly, the EU replaced the WEU as the major NATO partner and 
embarked on another three years of arduous negotiation that ended in the NATO-EU 
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‘Berlin-plus’ agreement of 2003. It “assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities 
able to contribute to the military planning for EU-led operations [and] the presumption of 
availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in 
EU-led operations.”66 Henceforth, the EU had two tracks available, one tied to resource 
dependency on NATO, and the other based on autonomy from NATO. The creation of 
the Helsinki Headline Goal soon afterward demonstrated Europe’s eagerness to advance 
on the autonomy track that was the heart and soul of the St. Malo Declaration.  
B. AUTONOMY AND THE ST. MALO DECLARATION  
The Franco-British St. Malo Declaration of December 1998 stated that the EU 
“must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the 
means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international 
crises…In this regard, the EU will also need to have recourse to suitable military means 
(European capabilities pre-designated within NATO’s European pillar or national or 
multi-national European means outside the NATO framework).”67 This section focuses 
on the motivations and rationale of France and Great Britain in their desires for 
autonomy, then examines the U.S. response to these perceived threats to NATO and the 
Atlantic Alliance.  
1. The British Rationale 
Right up until the St. Malo Declaration, Britain had held somewhat of an 
‘outsider’ reputation with the EU, particularly during the Margaret Thatcher years. 
Dedicated to maintaining national sovereignty over any form of supranational integration, 
the UK had historically placed “its extensive and special [Atlantic] relationships, its large 
military forces, and the fact that it is one of only two European nuclear powers (France is 
the other)” at the forefront of any ESDP development.68 Prior to the St. Malo 
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Declaration, Britain primarily deferred to NATO, the U.S. or its domestic policy on 
matters of security and defense. So what were the motivations and rationale behind Tony 
Blair’s emphatic joint declaration with Jacques Chirac of the desire for an autonomous 
European security and defense capability? 
Though a shock to the U.S., the UK was finally convinced of the crucial 
importance of strengthening a European defense capability, and this was the first time the 
UK was at the forefront of EU development. While the end of the Cold War forced 
NATO transformation, the inevitability of a decreased U.S. defense presence in Europe 
was coming to fruition. Rather than allow its neighbors on the European mainland to 
decide the particulars of the newly expanding European security and defense effort, the 
UK took a lead role with France (and later Germany) to ensure its preferences were aptly 
represented. They postulated that in order to keep the U.S. in Europe, they would have to 
strengthen the European pillar of NATO. Masters of strategic communication,69 the 
British set the stage in St. Malo, in order that they could maintain a significant influence 
in scripting, acting and directing the ESDP show. 
Two conditions that have been central to the UK’s strategic input to CFSP and 
ESDP have caused friction with other EU member states.70 First, the UK’s emphasis on 
sovereignty demands that ESDP remain intergovernmental, requiring unanimity for all 
major ESDP decision making. Second, the UK insisted that ESDP be firmly based in 
maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance. This second condition was not overly 
represented in the St. Malo declaration, but by endorsing the European autonomous 
security and defense capability agenda the UK gained greater strategic influence over the 
future of ESDP. France, on the other hand, was even more supportive of creating an 
autonomous structure that would allow freedom of decision making and ability to operate 
apart from U.S. approval or support. 
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2. The French Rationale 
“Although France was one of the original signers of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, 
it has always had reservations about giving up its sovereignty to any international 
body.”71 Having repudiated the European Defense Community in the 1950s and the 
supranational orientation of the European Economic Community in the 1960s, then using 
the referendum to barely ratify the Treaty of Maastricht and later squash the 
Constitutional Treaty, France was always torn between her European integrationist stance 
and her staunch desire for autonomy and sovereignty. Although France craved a strong, 
integrated Europe, she simultaneously did not give up her strive for ‘grandeur’.  
There is also the element of France’s anti-American stance which was as old as 
the Alliance itself. The fact that the U.S. had continually left France out of its European 
involvement began in 1948, when they were not invited to the initial NATO negations in 
Washington D.C. It was exacerbated when they did not receive any U.S. nuclear 
capabilities like the UK did in the 1960’s. Additionally, President De Gaulle’s aspiration 
for a stronger Europe in world affairs and the frustration of not realizing to return to 
NATO in 1996 added fuel to French anti-Americanism and a strengthened visions of 
greater security and defense autonomy apart from the U.S. and outside of NATO.  
The French desire for a stronger and autonomous European security and defense 
capability was also fueled by a desire to maintain deeper relations with its European 
neighbors, especially Germany. The St. Malo declaration served as France’s rally cry to 
motivate current and future European partners to pursue a more integrated Europe. Yet at 
the same time, France was hesitant to forfeit sovereignty or autonomy. This stance was a 
common among most of the EU member states. They supported the idea of an integrated, 
strong Europe but were reluctant to sacrifice any level of sovereignty and autonomy 
necessary for an international organization to succeed. Nevertheless, the U.S. perceived 
the potential threat to NATO and the Alliance inherent in the St. Malo Declaration, and 
responded with its own strategic communication.  
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3. U.S./NATO Response: Albright’s Three “D”s and Robertson’s Three 
“I”s 
Since WWII, U.S. policy on European defense suffered from the ambiguity of 
competing interests. On the one hand, the U.S. wanted a stronger European defense 
capability to create better burden-sharing.72 On the other hand, a stronger European 
defense might mean less U.S. influence in Europe, and thought of less influence was not 
favored. Torn between theses two poles since 1949, President Kennedy developed the 
two pillar concept in NATO, which only superficially hid the underlying anxiety. Now 
that NATO was at a crossroad, and Europe had declared its autonomous ambition, the 
U.S. was forced to face the challenging situation head-on.  
While the Clinton administration publicly supported this new turn towards a 
European defense in principle, it was quick to impress several caveats paramount to 
Europe’s progression down the road to autonomous security and defense operations. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright summed them up in a formula known as the ‘three 
Ds’: no decoupling, no discriminating, no duplicating. At the time, the EU’s limited 
military capabilities presented little concern for decoupling, and this first element gave 
political assurance that the transatlantic alliance would remain intact. The issue of 
discrimination recognized the differing memberships of NATO and the EU. While St. 
Malo announced the possibility of autonomous European action outside of the NATO 
context, this element was presented to ease concern of non-EU members and partners to 
NATO. Lastly, the element of duplication assumed NATO primacy, and was included to 
encourage Europe to invest only in those defense systems, political institutions, 
procedures, operations centers and headquarters that were not already available via 
NATO. As European states were experiencing falling defense budgets, this element 
would help focus funds toward capabilities that would maximize utility for both the EU 
and NATO, and also maintain some resource dependency on NATO. 
As the EU chose Javier Solana as their first High Representative for CSFP, his 
former post as NATO Secretary General was filled by Britain’s Foreign Secretary, 
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George Robertson. In an effort to smooth over the negative atmosphere of the ‘three Ds’, 
Robertson reinforced Secretary Albright’s ‘three Ds’ with his more positive and bridge-
building ‘three I’s’ “(indivisibility of the alliance, improvement of European capabilities 
and inclusiveness of all partners) to stress the underlying compatibility between European 
efforts and NATO reform.”73 While recognizing Europe’s quest for autonomy, U.S. and 
NATO responses were careful to ensure continuation of Europe’s resource dependency. 
They thus got into stark contrast with France, but tensions mounted with most EU 
partners as well. How did these early strategic communications set the stage for the future 
of ESDP? How autonomous are ESDP decision-making, capabilities and missions today? 
C. ESDP AUTONOMY AND DEPENDENCE TODAY (MILITARY VS. 
CIVILIAN) 
1. Decision Making 
The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) is a European 
Council-level body and provides the main political and strategic decisions with regard to 
ESDP. The Brussels-based ESDP staff contains over 200 officials It is made up of the 
Foreign Ministers from the 27 member states, meets monthly and receives 
recommendations from the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is composed 
of the member-state Ambassadors and a representative from the European Commission 
“fully engaged” in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) framework. The 
PSC continuously monitors the international situation and helps define policies via 
opinions to the European Council.74 Further, it exercises political control and strategic 
direction of crisis management operations as authorized by the Council. As a replacement 
of the former “Political Committee,” the PSC performs decision-shaping rather than 
decision-making functions, and relies upon the Council for political and strategic 
decisions.  
                                                 
73 Jean-Yves Haine, Berlin Plus (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004, http://www.iss-
eu.org/esdp/03-jyhb+.pdf (accessed May 14, 2007). 
74 The European Council is made up of the EU’s 27 member Heads of State. Throughout the text, the 
European Council will also be simply referred to as “the Council.” 
 36
The main bodies responsible for ESDP are located in the EU Secretariat, a huge 
organization responsible only to the member states and the current six-month Presidency. 
Thus, ESDP, as part of the second (CFSP) pillar, is organized intergovernmentally, 
strictly separated from the main EU institutions (Commission, Parliament, Court of 
Justice). Below the PSC, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) is composed of the 27 
member states’ Chiefs of Defense or their military delegates. This body provides military 
advice and recommendations to the PSC, and provides direction to the EU Military Staff 
(EUMS.)75 Some of the EUMC members are ‘dual-hatted’ by also sitting on the Military 
Committee of NATO. The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management 
(CIVCOM) is the civilian equivalent to the EUMC, and likewise provides an advisory 
role to the PSC and direction to civilian fielded headquarters during civilian operations 
and crisis management situations.  
The three subsidiary bodies associated with ESDP include: 1) the Satellite Center 
(SATCEN,) which provides satellite imagery from Terrejón, Spain; 2) the EU Institute 
for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris, aimed at creating a common European security 
culture, enriching strategic debate and promoting EU interests through research, forward-
looking analysis for the HR and development of transatlantic dialogue on all security 
issues; and 3) the European Defense Agency (EDA) in Brussels, which consists of the 
EU defense ministers and which has become the institutional roof and coordinating body 
for the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP).76 With a highly complex overlap, 
transitional web of bodies, how do they successfully implement EU peace operations and 
achieve ESDP goals? Let’s take a look at how they collectively make decisions and 
implement operations, specifically concerning the rules of voting and the impact on 
sovereignty.  
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Though seven years after initiation, ESDP remains a policy in the making that has 
developed internal procedures toward attaining the initial Helsinki Headline Goals.77 
Regarding decision making among the 27 member states, CFSP–other than the policies of 
the first pillar–does not embrace Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). In other words, 
unanimity is required and member states cannot be outvoted nor obligated to provide 
forces or finances for operations against their will. A member-state can opt-out of an 
operation by abstaining from voting (constructive abstention), or by merely not 
participating or paying for an operation.78 Further, ESDP-related provisions are not 
legally binding, not written down in the Treaties and are split on the topic of funding. 
Civilian-exclusive operations are more centralized at the CFSP and PSC level, and 
generally are funded by the EU. Military operations are more decentralized, whereby 
member states decide at the political and military Council-level what each will provide 
based on capabilities; they are usually self-funded by each participating member-state. 
This ad hoc mechanism of funding, specifically for military operations, is one of the areas 
of controversy ESDP is at present pursing resolution.  
Joint actions for both military and civilian operations are ultimately decided upon 
by the Council and achieve support through the voting system where unanimity is again 
applied. If more than one-third of the Council voters abstain, a ‘qualified abstention’ 
ruling blocks the decision. Additionally, while operations are commencing member and 
non-member states may leave or join a mission after deployment. Operational and tactical 
management is given to a military or civilian Head of Mission (as appropriate) who is 
answerable to the High Representative of the CFSP. The PCS exercises strategic control 
via monitoring and political feedback.79 This system structure allows for maximum 
flexibility in implementing operations and retaining national sovereignty by the fact that 
state sovereignty is only given up if a particular head of state volunteers resources that 
will be under the control of ESDP entities or other member-state commanders (under an 
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ESDP construct.) Even then, national sovereignty is maintained by the upholding the 
option to pull those resources back at any time in the process.  
2. Capabilities 
The capabilities of ESDP were originally set out in the Helsinki Headline Goal 
through a Capabilities Requirements list. In 2003, nearly 1.8 million active armed forces 
personnel were identified for ESDP within the (then 25) EU member states. The ESDP 
staff updated the Helsinki Headline Goal into two revised goals, namely the Military 
Headline Goal of 2010, and the Civilian Headline Goal of 2008. This section discusses 
capabilities within the context of the Headline Goals, addresses the ECAP process and 
highlights some of the challenges of the capabilities gap. 
The St. Malo declaration in December 1998 served as the impetus for establishing 
the Helsinki Headline Goal in December 1999. The Headline Goal called for the 
capability to rapidly deploy and sustain forces in the full range of the Petersberg tasks up 
to corps level (equivalent to 15 brigades or up to 60,000 troops.) These agreements did 
not imply the creation of a European army, per se, but rather set up a pool of national 
units that the EU can resource if a unanimous Council decision calls for military force in 
response to international crisis. In other words, there is no standing “EU Force” and no 
binding commitment to future crisis. However, a Headline Goal Task Force was 
established to plan a generic capabilities list that was approved in Helsinki in autumn of 
2000 titled the Helsinki Headline Catalogue. Later that year at the Brussels conference, 
member states voluntarily committed their forces to contribute specific capabilities in the 
Catalogue. In total, over 100,000 personnel, 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels 
were volunteered. This was only the first step, as thirty-eight capability shortfalls 
(twenty-one considered “significant”) were identified. The EU defense ministers 
followed-up with a Capability Improvement Conference and development of the 
European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) to address these shortfalls.80 
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The ECAP endeavor involved 19 panels of national experts who developed 
solutions that were coordinated by the Headline Goal Task Force. The ECAP process was 
guided by four core principles: 1) improvement of effectiveness, efficiency and 
coordination of EU defense efforts; 2) a ‘bottom-up’ approach relying on voluntary 
commitments; 3) coordination between EU member states and NATO; and 4) public 
support through ECAP’s transparency and visibility. Subsequent to the ECAP Panel’s 
first report in March 2003, the panel then assigned lead nations to tackle shortfalls within 
15 defined project groups. The ECAP engages issues such as deployability, mobility, 
airlift, sustainability of logistics and C4ISR81 interoperability.  
Though the EU had relative access to a military pool of over 1.8 million 
personnel, there were some major weaknesses that called for further improvement. These 
weaknesses included projecting/mobilizing the force, conscription status of over one-
third of the personnel pool, a significant proportion of ground forces still characterized in 
territorial defense thinking and a small research and development defense budget. The 
EU began addressing these shortfalls by enhancing the ECAP process. In May 2004, the 
EU endorsed the newly formed Military Headline Goal of 2010 and the Civilian Headline 
Goal of 2008, which set new standards for achieving a more robust Requirements 
Catalogue.82 One of these new capabilities is the Battlegroup (BG) concept. 
In an attempt to fulfill one of the main shortfalls identified in the Headline Goal 
Process, that shortfall being the lack of highly mobile specialized forces in a high state of 
readiness, France, Germany and the UK presented the BG concept and received EU 
defense minister approval of the BG concept as an official EU initiative. Each BG 
includes roughly 1,500 troops with appropriate support elements and is designed to be 
ready for deployment within 15 days of an approved launch decision. The BG serves as a 
stand-alone or initial-entry force that is fully manned, equipped and trained with 
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dedicated sufficient strategic lift assets. Each package is sustainable for 30 days initially, 
and extendable to 120 days with appropriate re-supplying. BGs can be formed solely by 
one EU member-state, by a lead member-state with supporting capabilities or by any 
other multinational solutions. The EU currently has the ability to undertake two BG-sized 
rapid response operations, as the BG concept was fully operational in January 2007.83 
Within seven years, ESDP has developed by pulling together 27 member states 
into achieving common goals for security and defense of the EU. From the Petersberg 
Tasks to the Headline Goals, the collective cooperation of sovereign nations has 
developed a working network of bodies to implement ESDP through the ECAP. Through 
this process, the EU has continually increased its capability. The challenges of mobility 
airlift, interoperability training and budget struggle through the capability gab with 
NATO and reduce inter-organizational autonomy. By pooling resources to avoid 
redundancy and focusing on a clear division of labor that takes into account member-state 
strengths, ESDP can potentially increase its efficiency.  
3. Missions 
ESDP became operational in 2003, engaging in four distinct civilian and military 
operations involving over 2,000 police and military personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC.) Additionally, the first civilian rule of law mission in Georgia was initiated 
in mid-2004. This section, briefly describes these five initial operations, the challenges 
that emerged and also contrasts the mission trends with the EU’s security concept.  
The EU took a gradualist approach in the scope of each mission. First, the EU 
Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina launched on 1 January 2003, marked the 
EU’s first-ever civilian crisis management operation under ESDP. The mission sought to 
establish local law enforcement capabilities for stability in the region following 
breakdown of the Yugoslav state in 1992, as the EUPM took over operations from the 
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United Nations’ International Police Task Force that had been in-place since the Dayton 
Peace Accords in December 1995. The EUPM planning team ensured the smooth 
transition of nearly 500 police officers and 60 additional staff. Though not an entirely EU 
operation, the EU assumed overall responsibility of the operation and contributed roughly 
80 percent of the staffing. All 25 EU member states contributed officers with specific 
objectives to develop police independence and accountability, to fight organized crime 
and corruption, to ensure financial viability and sustainability of the local policy and to 
create institutions and help build capacity. They set up seven programs in the region 
aimed at developing local crime police, a stronger criminal justice system, reliable 
internal affairs, proper police administration, strengthened public order and security, a 
consolidated a state border service and a healthy state information and protection agency. 
Initially slated to hand-over EU control in December of 2006, the EU decided to establish 
a follow-on mission as requested by the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities that will last 
through the end of 2007.84  
Following the EUPM, the EU launched Operation Concordia, its first military 
operation, on 18 March 2003. The FYROM invited the EU to take over NATO’s 
Operation Allied Harmony to ensure a secure environment while it implemented the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement settling its conflict in 2001. All EU member states (minus 
Ireland and Denmark) contributed nearly 350 lightly armed military personnel divided 
into 22 light field liaison teams traveling in non-armored vehicles. They provided patrol, 
reconnaissance, surveillance, situational awareness reporting and liaison activities and 
had support from eight heavy field liaison teams, MEDEVAC helicopters, Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal teams and a medical evacuation team. The operation was completed 8 
months later in December 2003.85  
The third operation began just three months after Concordia in the EU’s first 
military deployment outside Europe and first operation without NATO assistance. 
Operation Artemis tested the EU’s military capability by dispatching nearly 2,000 
peacekeeping troops to the unstable region of Ituri in the north-east part of the 
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Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Under French command, EU forces replaced 
existing United Nations (UN) peacekeepers from Uruguay for almost three months before 
another group of UN peacekeepers from Bangladesh were scheduled to be in place. This 
window provided a target of opportunity to test an ESDP self-sufficient operation. 
Thirteen EU member states contributed personnel and/or support functions during this 
mission to stabilize security conditions and improve the humanitarian situation in Bunie, 
the capital of Ituri, by protecting refugee camps, securing the Bunia airport, and ensuring 
safety of civilians, UN staff and humanitarian aid workers.86  
The fourth EU operation of 2003, EUPOL Proxima, was launched in December 
2003 originally slated as a year-long extension to Concordia in the FYROM. This 
civilian police mission actually lasted two years, and concluded in December 2005. 
Approximately 200 personnel were provided from fifteen EU member states and twenty 
non-EU member states, managed by the Belgian Chief Commissioner and headquartered 
in Skopje. The aim was similar to Concordia by maintaining a secure environment to 
facilitate implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.87  
The final operation in this initial set is the year-long EUJUST Themis, the EU’s 
first civilian Rule of Law mission via ESDP launched in July 2004. Designed to address 
urgent challenges in the criminal justice system, the EU answered Georgia’s request by 
providing insight and direction to ongoing reforms in three South Caucasus states of 
Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Specifically, this ESDP civilian mission provided 
justice reform guidance, anti-corruption coordinating efforts, new legislation planning 
and development of international and regional cooperation in the area of criminal justice. 
The ten-member staff worked in the key political and judicial offices of the Georgian 
capital of Tbilisi, and reflected the EU commitment to support neighboring efforts of 
stability and security in the South Caucasus.88  
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Like all new ventures, these initial operations were not without challenges. 
Lessons learned from these operations accompanied by the new Headline Goals 
highlighted a handful of operational, financial and planning challenges. Operationally, 
the aspects of reach, communications and sustainability were highlighted. Addressing the 
aspect of reach, procurement of new platforms such as the A400M platform transport 
aircraft and the Galileo satellite navigation system improved mobility and logistics 
means. Language barriers, a focus on interoperable systems at all levels, building 
relationships and an increased focus on force protection capabilities.89 Financially, ESDP 
efforts had relied on ad hoc mechanisms that complicated efforts, underestimated true 
mission costs and required lead nations to carry the brunt of preparatory costs. 
Responding to these financial challenges, the EU implemented (in March 2004) a 
permanent mechanism for handling common costs. This mechanism, known as Athena, is 
managed by a special committee and includes all EU member states (excluding Denmark) 
with decisions requiring unanimous approval and a binding nature. Athena covers 
common costs associated with incremental or fixed headquarters, transportation, 
administrative, accommodation, infrastructure, support and NATO common assets. 
Contributions to Athena from EU member states are based on Gross National Product. 
Operation planning also encountered challenges in the areas of procurement, planning 
support, media relations, collaboration with third countries and collaboration with 
international organizations.   
These initial years of ESDP reflected the EU’s fortitude, adaptability and 
expansive nature of ESDP. As of April 2007, having completed seven previous 
operations, the EU was simultaneously involved in nine on-going missions in six areas of 
operation covering three regions of the Western Balkans, Africa and the Middle East.90 
Most of these missions were civilian in nature. Primarily these are police missions that 
involve training, peace keeping, stabilization, treaty monitoring and border assistance. 
Additionally, ESDP provides rule-of-law assistance and training. ESDP currently does 
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not seek high-intensity military missions that are notoriously NATO- and U.S.-led, but 
rather focuses on the Petersberg Tasks of crisis management, peace-keeping/making and 
humanitarian/ rescue with a civil-military approach. This is precisely in line with the 
EU’s security concept, but does not completely meet the Petersberg Tasks due to the 
capabilities gap.  
This chapter highlighted the roots of Europe’s desire for autonomous security and 
defense capabilities during the last half of the twentieth century. The St. Malo 
Declaration served as the catalyst for the ESDP structure, decision-making, capabilities 
and missions of today. What are the current limits to ESDP? The next chapter explores a 
case study of ESDP actions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Through the lens 
of autonomy, this case study examines the scope and effectiveness of ESDP operations 
and identifies the characteristics in the latest dialectic of European autonomy within the 
security and defense arena.  
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V. CASE STUDY: EUFOR DR CONGO – RIPPLES OF 
AUTONOMY 
A. BACKGROUND AND SETTING 
The democratic world all but held its breath to see if the DRC’s first democratic 
elections in 40 years would first finally take place the summer of 2006; and second 
successfully occur in a peaceful manner. This former Belgian colony, having gained 
independence in 1960, quickly went from free democratic elections to a 32-year 
dictatorship (under Mobutu Sese Seko) in just a few years as the country of Zaire. The 
roots of democracy began to take hold again in 1980 when thirteen members of 
parliament demanded political reform from Seko, but failed when they were all arrested 
and banished for two years. These unfortunate reformers did not give up and later formed 
the Union for Democracy and Progress.91  
Led by Laurent Kabila in 1996, the reformers organized a revolution backed by 
Rwanda and Uganda rebel groups to oust Seko. They successfully ended the dictatorship, 
but brought violence to the region as over four million people were killed during the two 
civil wars that followed. The first was against Seko’s army (already mentioned), and the 
second began when the Rwanda and Uganda rebel groups that had originally backed 
Kabila fed their greed for power and assassinated him in 2001.  
Although an initial peace process had begun in 1999, it wasn’t until 2003 that the 
area began to calm down. At that time, Kabila’s son, Joseph Kabila, became president 
under an international-backed temporary government. This temporary government was 
formed with four vice-presidents, each representing major groups with interests in the 
DRC government, to include the Rwanda and Uganda rebel groups that had assassinated 
the elder Kabila. This allegedly corrupt and ad hoc temporary government was formed  
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with a 620-seat parliament, thirty-six ministries and an “integrated” army. The 
International Crisis Group reported in April 2006, that the DRC’s “institutions are weak, 
corrupt and factionalized.”92  
The situation has been festering for another potential civil war following the 
elections for the new permanent government. The 2006 elections marked the 6th attempt 
at actually completing these first free democratic elections in over 40 years. There were 
thirty-three presidential candidates, 269 parties and accusations of fraud on Kabila’s 
temporary administration as they had access to €422M donated to the election process. 
The UN has been operating in the area since 1999 and during the elections maintained 
17,000 peace-keepers throughout the DRC attempting to maintain peace, and help the 
administration overcome the tremendous hurdles of upholding order, updating roads, 
installing voting booths, and distributing ballots.  
B. UNITED NATIONS CALL FOR ESDP HELP: EUFOR RD CONGO 
The UN recognized that 17,000 troops was not enough, and asked the EU to 
provide help in the DRC capital city of Kinshasa.93 The ESDP military operation titled 
EUFOR RD Congo was claimed to be the first “autonomous ESDP military operation,” 
and was led by Germany’s Lt Gen Karlheinz Viereck, headquartered in Potsdam, 
Germany.94 Under UN Security Council Resolution 1671 (April 26, 2006), twenty-one 
EU member states and Turkey provided roughly 200 ground troops in Kinshasa and 
another 1,300 troops “over the horizon” outside of the DRC that were ready to respond if 
crisis broke out. They remained in-place for four months following the initial elections in 
July 2006, and only one month after the run-off elections in October 2006 to ensure 
stability of the UN mission, protect civilians, provide access to the Kinshasa Airport for 
potential limited extraction operations and provide force protection. This was the fourth 
ESDP mission in the area following Operation Artemis, and was added to an ongoing  
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civilian security reform mission and an ongoing civilian police mission in Kinshasa. How 
did the DRC, located in the Great Lakes Region of the African continent, hold the interest 
of the EU and fit into the Petersberg Tasks?  
There were a number of reasons for EU interest of ensuring the successful 
democratic process of the DRC. First, there was a feeling of “special responsibility” 
toward African countries resulting from Western Europe’s colonial period. The 
Europeans felt somewhat obligated to fight poverty, provide institution building and 
macro-economic support and ensure peace and stability. As a member of the international 
committee supporting the democratic transition, the EU wanted to help African countries 
maintain sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and establish good 
governance.95 A second reason was the issue of African migration to Europe. As violence 
and poverty ravaged the Great Lakes region, people were migrating northward, creating 
large refugee populations and pushing Northern Africans into Europe at increasing rates. 
A third reason was the EU’s “bad conscience” that nobody had really done anything 
about the prolonged human rights violations, short of feeding the problems with indirect 
aid in the form of funds and supplies that were easily horded and misused. Finally, the 
importance of a UN direct request cannot be underestimated. This request provided an 
opportunity to show the UN the growing cooperation with the EU and test its expanding 
capabilities in a limited, but gradually increasing operational scope. There were more 
reasons for involvement, but there were also many hesitations to get involved.96 
Just to name a few hesitancies, German authorities (and others) were concerned 
over the potential for engaging child warriors that were common in the rebel areas. There 
was also the potential that if the situation developed into civil war, the operation would 
be seen as ESDP’s first failure. Additionally, contrary to French authorities, German 
ESDP authorities tended to place loyalties toward the EU leadership before their own 
domestic leadership. This difference of approaches by two of the main member states 
created some conflict in the ESDP decision-making process at times. This type of tension 
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is an example of intra-organizational stresses on organizational autonomy whereby the 
principals greatly affect the agent’s ability to act. How do the outcomes of EUFOR RD 
CONGO affect the relevance of Petersberg Tasks and the autonomous intent of the St. 
Malo Declaration?  
C. OPERATIONAL SCOPE AND EFFECTIVENESS 
The EUFOR RD CONGO operation was considered a success as the DRC 
elections were completed with minimal violence. Although limited in scope, this 
operation ran smoothly from the UN’s request through EU decision making, 
mobilization, deployment, sustainment and re-deployment. Funding and logistics 
capabilities showed signs of progress but also room for improvement. 
This operation was limited in scope compared to the overall situation in the DRC 
and the African Great Lakes Region. Focused solely on the DRC capital city of Kinshasa, 
EURFOR RD CONGO maintained only about 200 troops on the ground and 1,300 over-
the-horizon in Gabon. These Kinshasa troops were effective during one particular 
incident “with the greatest destabilizing potential [that] occurred on 21 August 2006 with 
an attack on Vice-President Bemba’s residence. EUFOR intervention, in close 
cooperation with MONUC (the UN mission), was decisive in containing the potential 
spread of violence at a particularly sensitive moment in the election process.”97  The 
over-the-horizon capability also provided a significant security effect in Kinshasa while 
avoiding a high military presence. This reinforced the perception of EU neutrality, which 
was a key concern of EU leadership.  
The ESDP decision-making process was effective in clearly outlining objectives, 
scope and timeframes. The EU finalized Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP on April 
27, 2006, six months after UN Security Council Resolution 1635 was received on 
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October 28, 2005.98 It clearly outlined mission objectives, appointed commanders and 
headquarters and provided political, strategic and military direction. The operation was 
even partially funded via ATHENA, the EU-based funding source recently set up to incur 
common costs for ESDP military and civilian operations. The partial funding (70% of the 
estimated €16.7M in common costs) did not, however, include provisions for barracks, 
lodging and transportation.  
Logistically this operation highlighted the on-going shortfall of ESDP strategic 
airlift. They did not have ESDP assets to transport troops into and out of the forward 
operating locations. However, EUFOR leadership was able to logistically sustain 
operations for the full four months and redeploy troops within the provided timeline and 
objective. Regarding capabilities, the peace-keeping forces maintained successful patrols 
and prevented large-scale outbreaks of violence. Additionally, the EU Satellite Center 
proved invaluable to both EUFOR and MONUC purposes.  
Overall, EUFOR RD CONGO showed successful capability to provide peace-
keeping operations, autonomously from NATO, sustainable for four months outside the 
EU in a medium threat environment. Areas of improvement could focus on obtaining 
strategic airlift capabilities, more robust funding via ATHENA and testing logistic 
capabilities for longer sustainability operations and quicker decision-making scenarios, 
such as required in the EU Battlegroup concept.99 Additionally, although the EU had 
been involved in the DRC for the previous three years, it waited for a UN Security 
Council Resolution before embarking on this military operation.  
D. BREAKING NEW GROUND FOR ESDP AUTONOMY? 
How does the EUFOR RD CONGO mission affect the European dialectic of 
autonomy? This ESDP military operation in the DRC brought the EU closer to the St. 
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Malo Declaration’s intent of autonomy in a number of ways, yet there are still 
opportunities for improvement. The Petersberg Task of peace-keeping joined with the 
European Security Strategy focus on human rights and good governance. Solana reflected 
on a set of core values for strengthening a composite European identity and interacting 
with the rest of the world: “What are these elements? I would say compassion with those 
who suffer; peace and reconciliation through integration; a strong attachment to human 
rights, democracy and the rule-of-law; a spirit of compromise, plus a commitment to 
promote, in a pragmatic way, an international system based on rules.”100 The European 
Security Strategy of 2003 provides further support, stating: “The best protection for our 
security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, 
supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, 
establishing the rule-of-law and protecting human rights are the best means of 
strengthening the international order.”101  
Within the dialectic concept of European autonomy, EUFOR RD CONGO 
provided a stronger representation of intra-organizational autonomy than it did of inter-
organizational autonomy. Regarding intra-organizational autonomy, that is to say 
autonomy within the EU, member states maintained sovereignty on decision making and 
participation. They chose, through the Council, to appoint Germany as the lead nation. 
They chose the degree and the type of support they would contribute to the operation, all 
the while maintaining control of the option to pull-out at anytime. They were also able to 
provide their own peace-keeping capabilities necessary to a successful operation. 
Solana’s role as the High Representative of CFSP was granted a large amount of 
autonomy by the member states during the run-up to the operation by the fact that he was 
negotiating on behalf of the EU in New York. Principals were not fully informed of every 
detail of the negotiations and he subsequently was fully in charge of implementation, 
directing the EUMS. In this process the agent (Solana) was exercising more autonomy 
than the principals; autonomy that the principals had delegated to him, yet still a 
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significant amount that may or may not have been kept in-check based on full principal 
concurrence, trust, or possibly busy schedules and/or ambivalence. 
Concerning inter-organizational autonomy, this was a major operation which 
avoided resource dependence on NATO. The EU decided autonomously to act, 
conducted the operation independently and employed its own means of implementation. 
There was, however, some limitation to inter-organizational autonomy in that the EU has 
developed somewhat of a prerequisite for a UN Security Council Resolution before 
acting militarily outside the EU. Though this serves as a legitimacy-gaining process, it 
does put a limitation on pure autonomy. Whereas ESDP military operations have 
maintained this legitimacy-gaining process with the UN, the ESDP civilian operations 
process retains more inter-organizational autonomy by the fact that legitimacy-seeking 
has not a pre-requisite. Also, the lack of a strategic airlift capability created a limitation 
on autonomous logistics, hence lowering autonomy due to resource dependence. Finally, 
the EU also required the formal approval of the DRC government. Thus, the need for 
approval by the DRC and the UN, even if not NATO, severely restricted the EU’s 
autonomy through this multi-level bargaining process. 
As operations and decisions become more complicated in the future, especially 
after a first failed ESDP mission occurs, issues could escalate future hesitations by 
member states leading to stagnation in the ESDP process. The outcomes of the DRC 
situation could serve as a vector for ESDP to choose its future place in the world security 
landscape. How will it continue to develop military and civilian capabilities and try to 
close the gap between its own expectations?  
Although EUFOR RD CONGO was limited in scope, it represented a successful 
operation outside the EU that shifted the dialectic of autonomy closer to the intent of the 
St. Malo declaration. Inter-organizational autonomy, however, was stunted by a 
legitimacy-seeking process with the UN and a strategic airlift capability shortfall. (The 
final chapter concludes by reviewing the current EU dialectic of autonomy, its relativity 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION: A REALISTIC CONCEPT OF 
ESDP AUTONOMY 
Since the St. Malo Declaration in December 1998, the EU has pursued, with great 
vigor, an autonomous security and defense capability through ESDP. This thesis has 
explored various aspects of autonomy, including theoretical concepts in economics, 
sociology and psychology as well as intra- and inter-organizational elements via the 
principal-agent and resource dependence theories. It has outlined the importance of 
autonomy in ESDP formation and examined a recent real-world example of ESDP in 
action through a case study of EUFOR RD CONGO. This final chapter concludes by 
providing the current dialectic of EU autonomy through ESDP, analyzes how much of the 
St. Malo intent of autonomy has been achieved thus far, presents some limitations to 
autonomy inherent in ESDP and provides prospective thoughts on the future of ESDP. 
A. ESDP’S DIALECTIC OF AUTONOMY 
The dialectic of autonomy is one that dances between degrees of total dependency 
and pure self-sufficiency. The EU’s aspiration for an autonomous security and defense 
capability is entrenched in its rapidly developing ESDP effort. Yet, it is burdened by the 
reality that organizations never truly reach pure autonomy, as states are never fully 
sovereign. Being an international organization, the EU is faced with a dual-perspective 
concept of autonomy that has elements within the EU and among other international 
organizations.  
Intra-organizationally, the 27 member states within the EU create a complicated 
dynamic of control and influence between each other and with the EU bureaucracy. 
Principal-agent theory provides insight to the workings of this phenomenon whereby 
autonomy and sovereignty are occasionally affected in order to achieve agreement and 
action at the organization level. Varying degrees of EU member-state interdependence 
affect the fulfillment of EU and individual member-state needs. The ESDP bureaucracy 
and EU member states use control mechanisms such as rotating leadership, domination of 
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governing bodies, member-state decision making and member-state control over 
resources to control the amount of autonomy the EU can exert through ESDP.  
Inter-organizationally, the EU is resource dependent on NATO due to lacking 
assets and capabilities and is also dependent on the UN Security Council in gaining 
legitimacy for its military operations. Civilian operations, on the other hand, possess 
more inter-organizational autonomy than military operations by the fact that they do not 
require UN approval for legitimacy, and require lesser material capabilities. Even if the 
EU closed the military capabilities gap and reduced its dependence on NATO, the issue 
of maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance may be at risk as EU autonomy increases. 
Domestically, EU heads of state and member-state societies may also demand 
preservation of the UN Security council mandate prerequisite as the over-arching 
legitimating authority of military actions outside the EU.  
Since the St. Malo Declaration and the establishment of ESDP, this dialectic of 
autonomy has been shifting from a resource-dependent, principal-controlled status to a 
position of decreasing resource-dependency and increasing agent-empowerment as 
Solana strengthens ESDP. How close has the EU come to realizing the intent for 
autonomy declared in St. Malo?  
B. ACHIEVING THE ST. MALO INTENT OF AUTONOMY? 
The rhetoric of Solana would have the world believe that ESDP has already 
achieved autonomy. Supporting this claim includes a fully operational Battlegroup 
concept, successful completion of ESDP’s first autonomous military mission EUFOR RD 
CONGO and the establishment of the new EU Operations center within the EU Military 
Staff in Brussels (operational January 1, 2007.)102 Do these accomplishments alone truly 
meet the full intent of autonomy declared at St. Malo?  
Perhaps it depends on who is answering the question. Solana would likely answer 
in the affirmative, but allow that there is always room for growth and improvement. 
France may answer in the negative, and point out the continued dependency on NATO 
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assets and capabilities. Germany may also answer in the negative and stress the need for 
further European integration and more supremacy in ESDP. Britain may answer in the 
affirmative and push for a stronger focus on developing ESDP as the European pillar of 
NATO to strengthen the transatlantic alliance. The smaller countries of the EU may have 
a kaleidoscope of answers depending on their national interests and agendas and how 
they see themselves contributing to or benefiting from the current circumstance. The U.S. 
may answer that ESDP has enough autonomy already, and may see increased autonomy 
as a threat to transatlantic relations.  
Nevertheless, ESDP’s dialectic of autonomy has continually shifted towards more 
autonomy since the St. Malo declaration, both intra- and inter-organizationally. As with 
all dialectics, there eventually may be a shifting of the pendulum whereby ESDP 
autonomy begins to digress. Limitations of ESDP autonomy, such as capabilities and 
political will, may be the root cause of the eventual pendulum swing back. 
C. LIMITS TO ESDP AUTONOMY: CAPABILITIES AND POLITICAL 
WILL 
The Headline Goal 2010 set high expectations particularly for a strategic lift 
command and associated material assets.103 Member-state defense budgets, however, 
lack the ability for timely acquisition of these assets. Additionally, much of the EU’s 
military assets and capabilities today are coupled with NATO. Competing interests 
between NATO and ESDP military operations, though addressed in the Berlin Plus 
agreement, may increasingly cause friction with ESDP autonomy. Likewise, individual 
member states possessing these assets and capabilities may incur domestic interests that 
compete with ESDP (and NATO, UN) requirements. The “ownership” of high-demand 
assets and capabilities will gain a more leveraging, and hence, a more controversial effect 
as ESDP expands its assets, capabilities, mission and operational focus. The outcomes of 
this phenomenon will be increasingly dependent upon the political will of the concerned 
nation-states and competing international organizations.  
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ESDP is still in somewhat of a ‘honeymoon’ phase of development. The 
bureaucracy is pining for increased autonomy, positively pursuing growth and 
development and is relishing in a relatively common desire by its 27 member states to see 
it succeed. The European Parliament is seeking “increased parliamentary monitoring by 
[itself] and national parliaments, in order to ensure continued support.”104 The U.S. is 
cautiously encouraging a stronger ESDP so that it can burden-shift some of its perceived 
hegemonic global policing responsibility. Virtually all the stars of various Western 
political will are currently aligned to foster ESDP growth and increased autonomy at a 
reasonable rate.  
This same element of political will, nonetheless, could potentially create a limit to 
ESDP autonomy. Hurdles such as budgetary constraints, legitimacy, domestic opinion, 
competition with NATO and the U.S. and perceived or evident military/civilian operation 
failure could alter political will, posing it against continued support for growth and 
development of ESDP autonomy. The current decision-making process of pursuing 
ESDP operations requires unanimity. This system allows member states to abolish a 
potential ESDP action if their political will is strongly opposed to the action. The 
pressure placed on member states to support development of EDSP during this 
‘honeymoon’ phase may wear out over time, creating a reversal of the pendulum that is 
currently swinging in favor of ESDP autonomy. Yet, as the main growth area of the EU 
today, much will depend on the further institutional relevance of NATO, the U.S. 
commitment to Europe and European interests. So, what is the future of ESDP, and will it 
affect transatlantic relations? 
D. FUTURE OF ESDP AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO U.S. POLICY 
“The European Union is a global actor, ready to share in the responsibility for 
global security,” or so the Headline Goal 2010 reads.105 Though realists would scoff at 
the thought of an international organization as a corporate actor in international politics, 
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105 Headline Goal 2010, 1. 
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the EU is making its global mark with every military and civilian ESDP operation around 
the world. The number and frequency of ESDP operations have more than doubled 
annually since ESDP’s operational debut in 2003. Its dependency on NATO assets and 
capabilities is steadily decreasing.  
The future of ESDP is dependent upon the political will of EU member states and 
the relationships the EU maintains with other key nation-states and international 
organizations. The European Security Strategy provides the focus for future capability 
developments, missions and EU security and defense interests. An increased focus on 
strengthening transatlantic relations could likewise slow the train of development. What, 
then, are the implications for U.S. policy?  
The EU, via ESDP, is a viable U.S. partner in pursuing global security. NATO 
provides a vehicle for transatlantic relations; however, it is not all inclusive. Tensions 
within the EU/NATO debate focus directly on ESDP autonomy. U.S. policy-makers must 
first and foremost consider the importance of maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance 
when crafting U.S. foreign policy (with particularly interest to NATO policy). As long as 
the transatlantic community redefines and collectively adheres to a common set of values, 
as long as they preserve the delicate balance of strategic burden-shifting, as long as each 
member-state keeps it expression of sovereignty in check, NATO will maintain its 
political legitimacy and the alliance will live a long productive life.  
The intent of the St. Malo declaration is still energizing ESDP. The pendulum of 
ESDP’s dialectic of autonomy is swinging in favor of the EU. It is up to the EU member 
states, the EU bureaucracy and the relevant international organizations to discover the 
most effective amount of autonomy each can and should possess to effectively provide 
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